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Abstract:  We assess the impact of Argentina’s main social policy response to the 
severe economic crisis of 2002.  The program aimed to provide direct income 
support for families with dependents for whom the head had become unemployed 
due to the crisis. Counterfactual comparisons are based on a matched subset of 
applicants not yet receiving the program.  Panel data spanning the crisis are also 
used.  We find that the program reduced aggregate unemployment, though it 
attracted as many people into the workforce from inactivity as it did people who 
would have been otherwise unemployed.  While there was substantial leakage to 
formally ineligible families, and incomplete coverage of those eligible, the 
program did partially compensate many losers from the crisis and reduced 
extreme poverty.       
 
Keywords: Crisis; safety net; workfare; unemployment; poverty; Argentina 




World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3165, November 2003 
 
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange 
of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the 
presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited 
accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. 
They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they 
represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
 
                                                 
1   The work reported in this paper is part of the ex-post evaluation of the World Bank’s Social 
Protection IV Project in Argentina. The authors’ thanks go to staff of the government’s Institute of 
Statistics and Ministry of Labor, who helped greatly in assembling the data required for this paper, and to 
the World Bank’s manager for the project, Polly Jones, for her continuing support of the evaluation effort, 
and many useful discussions. Paula Giovagnoli provided excellent research assistance. Correspondence: 
















































































































d  2  3
1. Introduction 
  Income transfer programs are a common social policy response to macroeconomic crises. 
Stated aims vary in practice, but the common (explicit or implicit) goal is to help protect the 
living standards of those families most adversely affected by the crisis.  One of the largest such 
programs in recent times is the Government of Argentina’s Plan Jefes y Jefas (hereafter “Jefes”), 
introduced in January 2002.  This was the main public safety net response to the severe 
economic and political crisis that hit Argentina at the end of 2001.  Unemployment and poverty 
rates reached record levels during the crisis (World Bank, 2003).  Jefes aimed to provide direct 
income support for families with dependents who had lost their main source of earnings due to 
the crisis. To assure that the program reached those in greatest need, work requirements were 
imposed. With support from a World Bank loan (and equivalent counterpart funds from the 
government), the program expanded rapidly to cover about two million households by late 
2002.
2 
Our knowledge about the impacts of such programs has often been limited by a number 
of factors, including the speed with which crisis programs have to be scaled up and the paucity of 
appropriate survey data.  Yet opinions still abound, often based on little more than casual 
anecdotes.  In the case of Jefes, critics of the program have made claims about fraudulent 
participation, such as by pointing to cases of registered participants who do not appear to satisfy 
the program’s eligibility criteria, or to weakness in the implementation/effectiveness of the 
program’s counterpart work requirements.  At the other extreme, it has been argued that the 
scheme was a big success in reducing poverty and unemployment in the aftermath of the crisis.  
                                                 
2   In 2002, the Government of Argentina spent about US$500 million on Jefes, and about a quarter 
of that was financed through a World Bank loan. For 2003, the estimate is US$600 million, of which the 
Bank loan will probably cover about 50%. The loan and counterpart funds cover mainly the payments to 
beneficiaries. Most costs for materials, supplies, etc.  for the workfare projects are covered by the local 
governments or NGOs sponsoring the projects.   4
For example, by one assessment, Jefes is claimed to have accounted for the entire reduction in 
unemployment that was observed in the year following the crisis, which happened to roughly 
equal the increase in Jefes registrations over the same period (INDEC, 2002; World Bank, 2003).   
Such claims often rest on transparently weak foundations.  Anecdotes of abuse may well 
attract attention but may not be a sound basis for generalization.  And claims about (positive and 
negative) impact often ignore behavioral responses.  For example, it is unlikely that a program 
such as Jefes would not affect labor force participation choices.  Then it is unlikely that all 
participants would have otherwise been unemployed.  Similarly, one will clearly overestimate 
the impact on poverty if one ignores the foregone earnings of workfare participants, who are 
unlikely to be entirely idle in the absence of the program.     
Fortunately, we are in an unusually good situation to rigorously study the impacts of the 
Jefes program, given that large household surveys were done just before the crisis, in October 
2001, and one year later, in October 2002, and that the latter survey identified Jefes participants.  
Furthermore, one third of the October 2001 sample were followed up in the later survey round.   
This paper uses these survey data and the tools of non-experimental program evaluation 
to address the following (related) questions about the Jefes program:  
•  Who got assistance?  Were the program’s eligibility criteria enforced?  
•  How did participants respond to the program, such as through labor supply and household 
composition?  Did participants come solely from the ranks of the unemployed? 
•  What was the impact on the incomes of participating households?   What share of the 
income loss due to the crisis was recovered through the program? 
•  What was the distributional impact?  
•  What was the impact of the program on aggregate unemployment and poverty?   5
In addressing these questions, a key issue will be finding a valid comparison group for 
Jefes participants, i.e., a group of non-participants who have similar characteristics to the 
participants with the one exception that they did not get the program.  Here we will exploit the 
fact that we are studying the program in a period of rapid scaling up, which means that there are 
many current applicants to the program who have not yet received benefits.  We will argue that 
this group has advantages as the source of a comparison group, though we will also address 
concerns about possible selection bias, such that current participants are different ex ante to the 
current applicants.  One way this might happen is that current participants received larger income 
shocks from the crisis and so were the first to join the program. Another possibility is that the 
administrative assignment favored certain groups over others, possibly working against the 
program’s espoused objectives.  To help address these concerns we will use matching methods 
and longitudinal observations, comparing current circumstances for both participants and 
applicants with a pre-crisis baseline.   
The following section gives relevant background on the program.  This will motivate the 
questions addressed by the subsequent empirical work. Section 3 describes our data and gives 
descriptive results.  Section 4 outlines our methods for identifying the program’s impacts on 
income and employment while section 5 presents the results.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  The crisis and the public response through the Jefes program 
Argentina fell into a severe economic crisis at the end of 2001.  Widespread concerns 
about the impending collapse of the “convertibility plan” (whereby the Argentine peso was 
pegged to the $US) and possible default on external debt led to draconian measures to prevent 
withdrawals of Bank deposits, which in turn tightened liquidity constraints.  The final collapse of 
the convertibility plan, the subsequent sharp devaluation and default on foreign debt, combined   6
with the freeze on deposits, resulted in a large contraction in national output.  The almost 
immediate welfare impacts were severe.  Unemployment rose sharply as did various indicators of 
poverty (Fiszbein et al., 2002; World Bank, 2003).  The government’s statistics office estimates 
that the proportion of people living below the poverty line rose from 37% just prior to the crisis 
(October 2001) to 58% a year later (World Bank, 2003).   Widespread political and social 
instability ensued from the economic crisis.    
As the government’s main safety net response to this crisis, Jefes provided a cash transfer 
of 150 pesos per month to each eligible individual, representing about one half of mean 
household income per capita per month in Argentina in 2002.  Those formally deemed eligible to 
participate were unemployed household heads with dependents (children aged less than 18 or 
incapacitated).  In order to enroll, the potential participants had to request participation through 
the local municipality or through local offices of the Ministry of Labor.   
Jefes replaced a previous program, Trabajar.  This was a workfare program, though 
smaller scale than Jefes.  Trabajar entailed a tightly enforced work requirement of 30-40 hours, 
with targeting criteria to help assure that the work was of value to residents of poor communities.  
Trabajar has been found to have been effective in reaching the poorest, both as workers and 
residents (Ravallion, 2000; Jalan and Ravallion, 2003).  For example, 80% of Trabajar workers 
came from the poorest 20% of the Argentine population (Jalan and Ravallion, 2003).   
Given the magnitude of the crisis, the government’s explicit aim for the Jefes program 
was to reach a broader segment of the population than Trabajar.  At its inception, Jefes was 
advertised as a “universal” program, meaning that it was intended that anyone who wanted the 
transfer amongst those eligible could get it.  And (contrary to its predecessor), Jefes did not have 
an explicitly stated poverty focus.  However, genuine universality amongst households with   7
unemployed heads and dependents was clearly not sustainable.  In early 2002 concerns were 
emerging about the projected budgetary cost of Jefes.  And there were serious signs (based on 
largely anecdotal evidence) that the program was being heavily captured by people not in most 
need.  Administrative data provided by the Ministry of Labor based on registration records 
indicated that over half of Jefes participants were in fact women, and probably not “heads of 
households.”  In practice, the administrators did not check whether an applicant was really a 
head of household. There were also anecdotal claims that municipalities and provinces were 
signing up their employees to cope with the liquidity crisis, as well as claims that local civil 
servants were sending their wives (not in the workforce) to sign up for Jefes.  Possibly the 
program’s benefits were spilling over heavily to people who were not much affected by the 
crisis, or had the personal resources to cope adequately.  At the heart of this concern is the fact 
that verification of “unemployment” is problematic in Argentina, where over half of employment 
is in the informal sector.  All that the administrators could reasonably verify with confidence was 
whether an applicants had a formal sector job, and so was registered as such.    
Prompted by these concerns, a counterpart work requirement was introduced in early 
2002, with the aim of helping to assure that the transfers reached those in greatest need.
3  The 
work requirement was not as demanding as for the Trabajar program. Participants were required 
to do 20 hours of basic community work, training activities, school attendance or employment in 
a private company with a wage subsidy for six months.  The municipalities (together with local 
NGOs) were in charge of organizing the counterpart activities. Provincial offices of the Ministry 
of Labor, together with municipal and provincial councils were responsible for monitoring the 
work activities under Jefes.   
                                                 
3   As a condition for financing the program, the World Bank insisted that the vast majority (90% 
was the target) of Jefes participants had to be doing the counterpart work.   8
The counterpart work requirement is likely to entail implicit targeting to the poor, 
assuming that they tend to have lower reservation wages.
4  However, given the weak capacity to 
organize, supervise and enforce the work requirement at local level in such a large program, it is 
not clear how effective the Jefes work requirement was in practice compared to Trabajar.  The 
history (whereby the work requirement appeared as something of an afterthought), the rapid 
scaling up, and the circumstances of the crisis, may well have made it hard to enforce the work 
requirement.  And, of course, the self-targeting aspect of the work requirement materializes only 
insofar as the participants have to comply with it to obtain the transfer.   
The behavioral responses to such a crisis, and to such a large public program as Jefes, are 
clearly of interest.  There are various responses that could be expected — both to the crisis (such 
as through efforts to smooth consumption by income smoothing) and to the policy intervention.  
It has been argued that the entire participation in Jefes entailed a commensurate reduction in 
unemployment (INDEC, 2003).  This clearly ignores possible behavioral responses to the 
program through labor supply decisions, either to  participate in the workforce or change the total 
number of hours worked.   
Household family composition could well also respond to such a shock, by delaying the 
formation of new households (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2002) or by changing living arrangements 
as a response to receipt of a public transfer (Duflo, 2000). Household division (in the form of 
children sharing) has been anecdotally reported as a potential response to the Jefes program.   
Behavioral responses are also relevant to assessing impacts on poverty.  Following 
common practice, INDEC (2002b) calculated the program’s poverty impact by subtracting the 
Jefes payment from the incomes of participants.  Thus the poverty rate in the absence of the 
                                                 
4   Supportive evidence on this assumption for Argentina can be found in the results of Jalan and 
Ravallion (2003) on the Trabajar program that preceded Jefes.     9
program could be readily calculated from the simulated distribution of net incomes.   However, 
this ignores the fact that participants are unlikely to have been idle in the absence of the program, 
but would have found some sort of work, possibly in the form of casual “odd jobs.”  Ignoring 
participants’ forgone incomes will clearly lead to an overestimation of the poverty reducing 
impact of the program.         
 
3.  Data and descriptive results 
  We use the October 2001 and October 2002 rounds of the Encuesta Permanente de 
Hogares (EPH) done by the Government of Argentina’s Statistical Institute (INDEC).  The 
survey is only done in large urban areas (representative of 70% of the total population).  
Information is collected on employment, incomes, education and household demographics.  A 
subset of the sample is linked as a panel, with approximately one third of the sampled 
households in 2001 being re-interviewed in 2002.  For the purpose of this study, a special 
module on Jefes participation was administered in October 2002 to those adult members for 
whom Jefes was not the main occupation.  (The existing survey was deemed adequate for those 
for whom Jefes was the primary occupation.)  
  Before turning to the household-level analysis it is of obvious interest to see how the 
grossed-up aggregate participation rate in Jefes from the EPH compares to the administrative 
data on aggregate registrations.  This is complicated by the fact that, while the Jefes program had 
national coverage, the EPH sample frame excludes 30% of the population.  The Appendix 
presents calculations of how the EPH participation aggregate compares to the administrative 
records corresponding to the EPH sample frame.  By our preferred method (based on the 
applicants’ places of residence) the grossed-up EPH count of Jefes participants accounts for 91% 
of the administrative aggregate.  This is a significant discrepancy at the 5% level, though just   10
barely; at the upper bound of its 95% confidence interval, the survey estimate accounts for 99% 
of registered participants.  This does not suggest that there is likely to be a serious concern about 
undercounting of Jefes participation in the EPH relative to its sample frame.     
There is a question of how Jefes “eligibility” should be defined in terms of the EPH data. 
In practice, the status of being unemployed and a head of the household was certified via a 
signed statement by the beneficiary.  However, the only signal of unemployment status that 
could be reliably checked by the authorities was whether an individual was participating in the 
formal labor market.  It is thus of interest to consider a definition of eligibility that is close to 
what could be enforced in practice by the program administrators.  We will define a sampled 
adult as “eligible” if he or she is not employed in the formal labor market and lives in a 
household with a child (under 18 years and belonging either to the head or the spouse) or a 
handicapped person.  We will however point out some important differences between this 
“practical eligibility” definition and the official “theoretical eligibility” definition.     
 Table 1 compares Jefes participants from the EPH with households satisfying the 
program’s eligibility criteria.  About one third of those receiving the program did not satisfy the 
eligibility criteria. And  about 80% of those active individuals who were eligible (though not 
necessarily poor) did not receive the program. Notice that applicants not yet receiving the 
program were more likely to be ineligible than current recipients. 
Tables 2 and 3 give a broader set of descriptive statistics; Table 2 is for the full cross-
sectional sample in October 2002 while Table 3 gives results for the baseline sample of October 
2001.  In both cases, we split the sample between current participants and applicants who have 
not yet joined the program; we will draw a comparison group from the latter, so the comparison   11
of characteristics between the two groups is of obvious interest.   Comparisons are also drawn 
between these two groups and all eligible heads and all active adults in the sample.   
The average Jefes participant in the sample is female (69% of participants, as compared 
to 43% for all active adults) with an average age of 36 years, married, not a head of household 
(for 57% of participants) and has eight years of schooling.  Jefes participants are less likely to be 
heads of households than the sample of all active adults and more likely to be spouses of heads.  
The participants tend to come from larger households than average — 5.4 people per 
participating household as compared to 4.2 for all active adults — and this difference is due to 
the presence of more children in Jefes families.
5  Jefes families tend to be decidedly poorer on 
average, with a household per capita income that is about 30% of the mean for all active adults.  
If one nets out the Jefes transfer payment then participants came from households with an 
income per person that was only 17% of the mean for all active adults.  It is notable that Jefes 
participants and applicants tend to have similar characteristics, though we will examine this more 
carefully later using a multivariate model.  
Notice that the families of Jefes participants tend to be poorer on average than eligible 
heads of households. As we saw in Table 1, there is quite a high incidence of ineligibility 
amongst Jefes participants, and limited coverage of those eligible. Most of the ineligibility stems 
from not complying with the dependency criteria (having dependents of the head that are 18 
years of age or handicapped).  
However, the ineligible Jefes participants are less poor than those eligible.  Indeed, as can 
be seen from Figure 2, when we compared the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of 
household income per person for eligible participating families with ineligible ones we found 
                                                 
5   Note that the extent of multiple participants in the same household is limited: 13% (7%) of the 
participating individuals (households) live in household with more than one beneficiary.   12
first-order dominance, such that no matter what poverty line or poverty measure is used the 
eligible participants are poorer than the ineligible participants.
6  Most of the ineligibility stems 
from not complying with the dependency criteria (having dependents of the head that are 18 
years of age or handicapped). Tighter enforcement of this criterion would improve the program’s 
performance in reaching the poor, albeit slightly. Turning to the pre-crisis baseline survey for 
October 2001, we find that 43% of Jefes participants in October 2002 were employed a year 
earlier, while 38% were inactive and only 19% were unemployed (Table 3).  The unemployed 
participants were more likely to be represented in the bottom decile of the income distribution.
7 
Jefes participants and applicants have similar baseline characteristics in the panel.  
One possible source of bias in our use of applicants as a comparison group is that the  
participants may have received larger latent income shocks in the crisis than did the applicants 
that have not yet joined the program.  This could happen if those households who received the 
largest shock were first to apply and be accepted.  Then the measured income losses for the 
applicants during the crisis will underestimate the counterfactual income losses for participants. 
We can assess the likely extent of mismatch in terms of shocks by comparing the income 
changes under alternative assumptions about the share of foregone income in the construction of 
the counterfactual income of Jefes participants.  Then we can calculate the corresponding income 
shock using the panel data. The comparison in the distribution of shocks between Jefes 
participants and the applicants not yet receiving the program gives us an idea of the extent of the 
bias under alternative hypotheses on the net gains from the program.  If our identifying 
                                                 
6   This holds for a broad class of additive poverty measures (Atkinson, 1987).  
7   More precisely, 26% of previously unemployed participants are in the bottom decile of the 
income per capita distribution in 2001, as compared to 16% of the previously inactives and 11% of the 
previously employed participants.    13
assumption holds, the expected change in income in the absence of the program should be the 
same for participants and their comparison group. 
Under a priori plausible assumptions about the foregone income of participants based on 
evidence for the Trabajar program, we find that the distribution of income shocks is reasonably 
well balanced between the sample of Jefes participants and the applicants not yet receiving the 
program. Table 4 gives the distributions of the income shocks for household and individual 
incomes for various assumptions.  We see that the expected change of income in the absence of 
the program is balanced across the two groups when one assumes a foregone income of about 
one-third to one half, which is consistent with the estimates by Jalan and Ravallion (2003) for the 
Trabajar program that preceded Jefes.  However, the tighter work requirements on Trabajar may 
well mean that Jefes forgone incomes are lower.  The last column of Table 4 is based on our 
preferred estimates of foregone income of the Jefes participants; we will explain how these 
estimates were obtained in the following sections.  Again we find a good balance of the income 
changes between participants and applicants. Table 5 shows where the participants are found in 
the pre-crisis national distribution of income.  For this purpose, Jefes participants were assigned 
into national deciles based on household income per person in October 2001.  We find that 15% 
of the participants were initially in the lowest decile of the income distribution; 40% are in the 
poorest 20%.  And 90% were amongst the poorest 60%, which was about the official poverty 
rate at the time.  
To throw further light on the role played by the eligibility criteria, Table 6 shows that 
unemployed heads of the households with dependents would have been highly concentrated in 
the bottom 20% of the income distribution before the program.  The Table also gives results for a 
“theoretical” eligibility criteria close to the program’s official aim of reaching unemployed   14
heads.  (Recall that we have used a weaker definition, closer to what could be implemented in 
practice given the information available to local administrators.)  The theoretical target 
population identified by the decree turns out to be quite narrowly defined, representing a small 
fraction (5%) of the population at the baseline.  About 45% of the heads have dependents aged 
less than 18 or incapacitated.  Of those, only 12% of the sample of heads with dependents were 
unemployed as of October 2001 (80% were employed, and 8% were inactive). 
Contrary to the theoretical target population, these practical eligibility criteria are quite 
broad and only slightly progressive (Table 7). These criteria, if perfectly enforced, would allow 
Jefes to reach about 50% of the poor at a poverty line of about 100 pesos. 
To help assess the distribution of gains from the program, Table 7 gives selected points 
on the concentration curve using the cross section samples, under the assumption of zero 
foregone income and for our preferred estimates of foregone income (discussed in detail later).  
Comparable results are also given for the preceding Trabajar program. Figure 1 gives the 
complete concentration curves.  Jefes is clearly not as well targeted as Trabajar.  This is 
consistent with expectations that the work requirement was not as tightly enforced in Jefes. 
However, spending on Jefes appears to be better targeted than other categories of social spending 
in Argentina.  World Bank (1999) (quoting Gasparini, 1999) presents estimates of the 
concentration curves for overall social spending indicating that the poorest 20% receive 22% of 
the outlays (30% for the sub-component of social services) while the next poorest 20% receive 
20% (19% for social services).
8   
                                                 
8   Analogously, the concentration curve shows that targeting performance for Jefes is better than a 
median transfer program by international standards and Latin American standards, as indicated by the 
results of Coady, Grosh  and Hoddinott (2002),. A median social assistance program in Latin America is 
60% more progressive than a neutral allocation (compared to 25% of a median transfer program in 
developing countries).   15
4.  Methods for assessing impacts 
We follow common practice in defining “impact” as the difference between the outcome 
indicator with the program and its counterfactual value for participants in the absence of the 
program.  Also following common practice in the evaluation literature, our estimate of the 
counterfactual will be based on a matched comparison group of non-participants.  As in all 
evaluations, the reliability of this method depends crucially on whether the comparison group has 
sufficiently similar characteristics to the participants in the absence of the program.      
A natural starting point in finding a comparison group for the current participants in Jefes 
is by studying those individuals who have applied to the program but have not received it yet.  
We term this group the Jefes applicants.  Restricting the comparison group to this sample has the 
appeal that the applicants have already indicated a preference towards participation in the 
program (Angrist, 1998).  To some extent, unobserved factors influencing participation (such as 
shocks associated with the crisis) are revealed by the applicants.  
However, one cannot rule out latent heterogeneity between participants and applicants 
that can bias impact estimates on using the applicants as the counterfactual.    As we saw in 
Table 1, the applicants are less likely to satisfy the eligibility criteria than the current 
participants. To control for observable heterogeneity amongst the applicants we apply propensity 
matching techniques to construct a counterfactual outcome from the sample of applicants not yet 
receiving the program.  Let  i D  be an indicator of participation in Jefes; 1 = i D  if individual i 
participates and  0 = i D  if not.  Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), matching methods 
estimate the outcome without the program by taking weighted averages over outcomes for 
individuals who did not participate that are observationally similar to the participants in terms of 
their propensity scores, given by  = ) ( i X P  Prob( i D= 1| i X ),  the probability of participating   16
conditional on observed (predetermined) covariates  i X . Matching aligns the distribution of 
observables between the comparison group and participants.  
This leaves the problem of selection bias due to unobservables. To help reduce this bias 
we exploit a subsample of panel households interviewed in both the baseline (October 2001) and 
after the program (October 2002) to obtain a double difference (sometimes called “difference-in-
difference”) impact estimator. This eliminates any time-invariant additive selection bias due to 
unobserved heterogeneity between participants and the applicants not yet receiving the program.  
Matching in combination with double-difference has been found to be effective in eliminating 
selection bias, to the extent that it is due to time-invariant omitted effects that might matter to 
participation (see, for example, Heckman et al. 1997).  The panel sample will also allow us to 
look at how impact varies according to differences in baseline characteristics. 
We have data for October 2002 on N participants, indexed i=1,..,N  and C comparators, 
j=1,..C in the region of common support, i.e., the set  )} 0 ) 0 | ( ˆ ) 0 ) 1 | ( ˆ : { > = ∩ > = D P f D P f i i i  
where  f ˆ  is the empirical density of the scores. The smaller panel sample contains n and c 
individuals in the matched treatment and comparison groups.  Let 
k
it Y  be the outcome of interest 
for individual i at time t in state k.  There are two possible states for the outcome: k=1 in the 
presence of the program, and k=0 in its absence and there are two possible dates t=0 (October 
2001) and t=1 (one year later, the date at which program participation is observed). The 
evaluation problem of estimating the impact of any program stems from the impossibility of 
observing simultaneously both states for the same individual.  Since nobody participates at the 
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where the Wij’s are the weights in calculating the counterfactual for each participant.  We use the 
local linear weights, which have been found to perform better at the boundaries of the propensity 
score, where the extent of the bias is greatest for conventional methods (Heckman et al., 1997.) 
SD identifies the impact of the program in expectation if there is no selection bias; the condition 




1 = = = D X P Y E D X P Y E  
where the expectation is taken over the distribution of unobservables.  Our matched double 
difference on the other hand is estimated on the matched panel sample, and is given by: 
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This will give an unbiased estimate of impact if the selection bias is time-invariant and additive, 
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5.  Impacts on incomes and employment 
Table 8 gives the probits used for calibrating the propensity score function on the pooled 
sample of participants and current applicants (who have not yet joined the program).  Two 
probits are given, one for the October 2002 cross-section (to be used for the matched single-
difference calculations) and one for the panel.  Initial occupational status in 2001 (and the type of 
occupation) is included in the estimation of the propensity score in the panel sample.  Otherwise 
the explanatory variables used are similar.   
The first thing to note is that the probits have low explanatory power for participation.  
The samples of participants and applicants are clearly quite similar ex ante in terms of 
observables.  We checked the sensitivity of our results for the panel sample to the inclusion of   18
baseline household income. The variable was not significant and its inclusion did not affect the 
subsequent estimates of the net gains from the program.   
Given the evident similarity of the Jefes participants and current applicants, it is not 
surprising that we find a large region of overlapping support, both in the SD and in the DD 
matching, as can be seen from Figure 3. 
Nonetheless, there are some significant covariates of participation.  We find that Jefes 
participation increases with age and is more likely for females, for households with a higher 
share of children below 18, and for those who were public employees at the baseline (Table 8).  
Geographic effects are jointly significant.  
On using these probits to estimate the propensity scores for matching we can now 
calculate SD and DD as given by equations (1) and (2).  Table 9 gives our estimates of the 
program’s impacts on incomes and employment.
9   We give estimates for both household income 
gains as well as the individual gains for the Jefes participants. 
Our mean impact estimates suggest that participants would have had a larger drop in real 
income in the absence of the program. Our comparison group experienced a mean drop in real 
income of about 250 pesos per month over this year.  For Jefes participants, the decline was 150 
pesos.  This suggests that Jefes acted as a partial safety net and attenuated the drop in income 
relative to what their household would have experienced otherwise.  We find that net gains are 
on average between a half and two-thirds of the gross wage, depending on whether one uses SD 
or DD.  The single difference method gives lower net gains from the program.   
  However, we also find considerably greater imprecision in the DD estimates and in the 
household level SD estimates compared to the individual-based estimates.  Indeed, for DD 
                                                 
9   Real income is adjusted for regional differences in the cost-of-living. In the panel sample, real 
income figures are at base October 2002. (The annual inflation rate was 39.4%.)   19
household income, the 95% confidence interval includes 150, implying that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of zero foregone income in this case.   
A further indication of the high variance in the double-difference estimates can be found 
in the household and individual level impact estimates underlying the means in Table 9.  While 
naturally there is great imprecision in the individual estimates of impact, studying the 
distribution of those estimates gives a useful indication of which of our estimation methods is 
most plausible.  On a priori grounds, it is plausible that the bulk of the income gains will tend to 
be found in the interval (0,150).  We cannot rule out the possibility that some people might have 
given up a job earning 150 pesos per month to join Jefes (presumably because of differences in 
the disutility of work), but it seems unlikely.  Equally well, it is unlikely that the net income gain 
would exceed the gross transfer payment under the program.   
By this criterion, all but our individual SD estimates are implausible.  For DD, we find 
that 20% of the individual income gains are negative and 60% exceed 150 pesos.  For 30% of the 
sample, the DD household income gains are negative while 54% exceed 150 pesos.  For the SD 
estimates, we find that half of the household income gains are negative and 30% are greater than 
150.  However, we find that 83% of the individual SD estimates are in the interval (0,150); only 
5% of individual income gain estimates are negative, while 12% are greater than 150. 
In the following discussion we will thus take the individual SD results to be our preferred 
estimates on a priori grounds.  However, we will still give the DD results when they appear to 
contain insights that cannot be revealed by the estimates based solely on the cross-sectional data.   
Turning to the impacts on employment in Table 9, we find that on average about half of 
the participants gained work as a result of the program: half of these were drawn from 
unemployment (women and men) and half from inactivity (mostly women). Moreover, on   20
average, Jefes participants increased their hours of work by about 10 hours. In this respect, SD 
and DD results are similar.   The results overall are suggestive of foregone income in that the net 
increase in hours worked is about half the Jefes stipulated work requirement of 20 hours.
10   
  It is clear from these results that Jefes did not just displace unemployment.  Indeed, 
roughly as many participants came from those who would otherwise not have been active in the 
workforce. This implies that assuming that all Jefes participants would have been otherwise 
unemployed would grossly overestimate the impact of the program on the rate of unemployment.  
We can now use our estimates of the program’s impact on labor-market status to estimate 
the impact on the unemployment rate.  Our preferred SD estimates from Table 9 imply that 26% 
of Jefes participants would have been unemployed if not for the program, while 23% would have 
been inactive.  Table 10 gives the counterfactual unemployment rates (as well as the activity and 
employment rates).  We also compare these to INDEC’s (2002a) estimates that had assumed that 
all Jefes participants would have been unemployed without the program.   
It can be seen that allowing for the behavioral responses implied by our results gives an 
appreciably lower impact on the unemployment rate.  While INDEC’s calculation implies a 5.8 
percentage point drop in the unemployment rate due to the program, we get an impact of 2.5 
points.  In contrast to the claim by a number of observers (including INDEC and World Bank, 
2003), Jefes was not responsible for bringing down the unemployment rate in the aftermath of 
the crisis;  we find that the unemployment rate would have fallen between May 2002 and 
October 2002 even without the program.  
                                                 
10   We found that 78% of Jefes participants doing the work requirement reported exactly the legally 
required number of hours (20). This may reflect the fact that municipalities, in order to generate work for 
a large number of participants, employed them for the minimum number of hours. It is also possible that 
some participants over-reported their number of hours worked to accord with the legal requirements.   21
In Table 11 we explore further the DD estimates of impacts.  We find that those attracted 
out of labor market inactivity were primarily women.  However, we find no evidence of labor 
supply responses of other members of the household, other than those from the change of labor 
status of the beneficiary (the net gains of number of employed/unemployed/inactives mirrors the 
labor supply changes at the beneficiary level). 
Nor are there signs that households responded by changing their household size (such as 
by sharing children) in order to gain access to the program.  Household size rose slightly more 
amongst participants than amongst applicants, but the difference is not statistically significant.  
This is not too surprising, given that our results suggest that the program’s eligibility criteria 
were not rigorously enforced.  Moreover, the household division might not actually take place to 
the extent that ‘children sharing’ represents only a tool to register into the program.   
Table 12 stratifies the net gains.  We find considerable heterogeneity in impact.   Those 
who were unemployed/inactive before the program had no foregone income, so their income 
gain from the program is the gross wage.  By contrast, those who were previously employed had 
a high forgone income.  Spouses of the head and females had on average larger net gains, given 
that they are more likely to be drawn to the program from unemployment or inactivity, relative to 
men, for whom the opportunity cost of Jefes participation was clearly higher.  Table 12 also 
gives SD impact estimates for individual incomes constrained to be within the interval (0, 150).  
This indicates that forgone income accounts for about one third of the Jefes payment.
11   
Using our preferred SD estimates,  Figure 4 gives the implied impacts on poverty 
amongst participants, as indicated by the CDF of income per person.  The lower curve gives the 
observed (post-intervention) CDF, while the upper curve gives the CDF implied by our estimates 
                                                 
11   In our constrained estimates, the individual net income from Jefes represents the main source of 
individual (household) income for about half (one quarter) of the sampled participants.   22
of the impact of Jefes at each sample point.
12  At a poverty line of around 100 pesos per month, 
the poverty rate amongst Jefes participants fell from about 82% to 70% due to the program.  At a 
poverty line around 50 pesos, the poverty rate among participants fell from about 51% to 29%.  
Figure 5 gives the implied impacts on the poverty rate nationally. The CDF’s of income 
per person pre- and post-intervention are calculated in the same way as for Figure 4.  It is evident 
that the program had only a small impact on the poverty rate nationally, over a wide range of  
poverty lines.  These results are confirmed by Table 13, which gives poverty incidence 
nationally.  The government’s two official poverty lines are used; the lower line is called the 
“indigence line,” which is the food component of the full poverty line.  The table gives the 
official estimates in October 2002, the INDEC estimates of the counterfactual poverty incidence 
for that date assuming no foregone income, and our estimates using our preferred SD estimates 
of the net income gains.   The impacts at the upper and lower poverty lines are negligible in both 
cases, though a more sizeable (two % point) decline in extreme poverty is indicated.   
A further perspective on the ability of Jefes to reduce poverty can be obtained by using 
the panel data to compare the actual joint distribution of income between poor and non-poor over 
time with our estimated counterfactual distribution for Jefes participants (following the 
methodology in Ravallion et al., 1995).  Thus we can distinguish the extent to which a program 
provides “protection” of those vulnerable to poverty from “promotion” of the poor; promotion 
refers to the extent to which Jefes helped participants escape poverty, while protection refers to 
the impact of Jefes on the number who fell into poverty.   
Table 14 provides the distribution of poverty incidence over time for the sample of Jefes 
participants, using the official poverty line and the lower food poverty line provided by INDEC.  
                                                 
12   This is the same counterfactual distribution used to calculate the counterfactual income shocks for 
the panel sample, as used in the last column of Table 5.   23
Looking first at the actual joint distribution, we find that 20% of the participants were not poor in 
2001 but became poor in 2002, while only 2% of the poor in 2001 escaped poverty by the 
following year.  71% were poor in both period.   
We compare this joint distribution with the counterfactual distribution based on our 
preferred SD individual estimates of the counterfactual incomes in October 2002.  Without Jefes, 
22% of the participants were not poor in 2001 but became poor.  And only 1% escaped poverty.  
The impacts are greater if we focus on the lower poverty line.  Then we find that with Jefes, 30% 
were not poor in 2001 but poor in 2002.  However, in the counterfactual joint distribution 
(without Jefes), 40% fell into poverty. The impact on promotion is again lower; with the 
program, 8% escaped poverty, while it would have been 5% without the program.            
The results confirm the “social protection” nature of the program. Jefes had a small 
impact in helping the participants escape poverty. On the other hand, we find that an extra 10% 
of the participants would have fallen into extreme poverty in the absence of the program.  
What role did the work requirement play?  We interpret our results as indicating that the 
work requirement was having some impact. In the October 2002 cross-section, 80% of the 
sampled participants reported having done counterpart work for Jefes.
13  The extent of forgone 
income and hours are also suggestive that the work requirement was having an impact.  Taking 
our constrained individual SD estimates to be the most plausible, the mean foregone income is 
about 50 pesos per month, or one third of the Jefes payment.  This is lower than the estimates for 
                                                 
13   Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to define a consistent definition of the type of activity 
undertaken by the participants. The definition of what represents ‘work’ is not consistent depending on 
whether Jefes participation represents the main economic activity of the participants or not. Participants 
with Jefes as their main activity are defined to be doing a ‘controprestaction’ if they are working positive 
hours (among those, about half of them report working for the public sector, 30% for community service 
and 8% report working for a private company). For those whose participation in Jefes is a secondary 
activity, counterpart work is self-reported community service (32%), participation in training (41%), or 
school attendance (13%) as part of the program.   24
the Trabajar program in Jalan and Ravallion (2003), who estimated foregone income to be 100 
pesos per month — about half the Trabajar wage.  However, it is unsurprising that Jefes would 
have lower foregone income given the general decline in real wages due to the crisis (World 
Bank, 2003); the opportunity cost of participation in workfare would undoubtedly have been 
lower in the wake of this crisis.  While we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero foregone 
income for the double-difference estimate of the impact on household income, this is attributable 
to the considerably greater noise in this estimator.  
 
6. Conclusions 
We have studied a large social protection operation, Plan Jefes y Jefas, undertaken by the 
Government of Argentina, with support from the World Bank, in response to the 2002 crisis.  In 
identifying impact we have used applicants who have not yet been accepted into the program as 
the source of a comparison group.  To help clean out remaining sources of selection bias we have 
used propensity score matching methods and longitudinal observations following a (pre-crisis) 
baseline survey.   
The Jefes program provided a basic cash transfer to all households satisfying certain 
eligibility criteria and for about 80% of participants the transfer payment came with a work 
requirement.  However, it is clear from our results that the program’s eligibility criteria were not 
rigorously enforced.  We find that about one third of those receiving the program do not satisfy 
the eligibility criteria (and about three fourths of those adult individuals who are eligible are not 
receiving the program).  The aim of only targeting unemployed heads of households with 
dependents was clearly not realized; indeed, our results suggest that a large share of participants 
were women who would have not otherwise have been in the labor force.  About half of the 
employment gain due to the program came from unemployment and half from inactivity.     25
We estimate that the program reduced Argentina’s unemployment rate by about 2.5 
percentage points.  This is less than half of previous estimates that have assumed that all Jefes 
participants would have otherwise been unemployed.  We find evidence that Jefes tended to have 
a positive opportunity cost for participants, consistent with the work requirement being binding 
for the many participants.   Factoring in the foregone incomes, the program had a small effect on 
the overall poverty rate, though a more sizeable impact on the incidence of extreme poverty. For 
example, the program allowed an extra two percent of the population to afford the food 
component of Argentina’s poverty line.  A degree of protection from extreme poverty was also 
achieved; we estimate that an extra 10% of the participants would have fallen below the food 
poverty line without the program.      
Jefes clearly helped participants, who would have suffered an appreciably larger drop in 
their incomes without the program.  We find that the program’s performance in reaching the poor 
during the crisis was better than is typical of social programs in Argentina.  About one half of 
Jefes participants came from the poorest fifth of Argentine families, and all but 10% fell below 
the official poverty line; this is better than average for social spending, though it is not as good as 
for the program Trabajar that preceded Jefes.   
Overall, the Jefes program does appear to have contributed to social protection during the 
crisis, despite the fact that its actual implementation differed from its design.  The work 
requirement undoubtedly helped in assuring self-selection.  We would expect tighter 
enforcement of the work requirement and eligibility criteria to improve performance in reaching 
the poor.    26
Appendix: Comparison with administrative records  
  Comparing the survey aggregates on Jefes participation for the EPH with the 
administrative records is complicated by the fact that the sample frame for the survey does not 
coincide with the (national) coverage of Jefes.  This can be dealt with by confining the analysis 
of the administrative data to those areas included in the EPH sample frame.  We consider two 
ways of doing this.  In the first, we only use the administrative data for those municipalities 
included in the EPH sample frame, based on the location of the participants’ Jefes registration.  
In other words, we only consider participants registered in the geographical areas where there is 
an overlap of municipalities with the sample frame of the EPH.   In the second, we restrict the 
administrative data to those who have their recorded domicile in the EPH sample frame, i.e., we 
only consider participants whose residence is in the same conglomerate (according to the zip 
code) as where they receive their payment (boca de pago).  This second method deals with cases 
in which a person registers in a nearby city in which she is not in fact resident. 
Table A1 gives the results.  The grossed-up estimate of Jefes participation represents 
about 80% of the registered applicants from the administrative data.  The aggregate from the 
administrative data is outside the 95% confidence interval of the survey-based estimate.  When 
we breakdown the aggregates by urban areas, the administrative count is outside the 95% 
confidence interval (CI) for 18 areas.  And these are all cases in which the survey estimate of 
participation is lower than the administrative data suggest.   
As one would expect, switching to the residence-based assignment of Jefes participants to 
urban areas reduces the discrepancy. The tighter matching by residence puts the administrative 
data close to the upper bound of the 95% CI in the aggregate,  but it still leaves 14 areas for 
which the survey gives a significantly lower count.      27
The results of Table A1 suggest that the survey is under-representing Jefes participation.  
It is unclear what the source of the discrepancy might be.  It could be due to respondent 
ignorance of Jefes participation, or a conscious desire to hide participation because of formal 
ineligibility.  Alternatively it might reflect over-counting in the administrative data.  This could 
arise if there is some expropriation of the Jefes transfers for other purposes.  However, once one 
allows for the residence-based assignment of participants it does not appear that the discrepancy 
is so large as to warrant serious concern about sampling bias in the EPH.   28
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Table 1: Errors of inclusion/exclusion  
 Ineligible  Eligible  Total 
Applicants /participants       
Not receiving Jefes  677  824  1,500 
row %  45.1%  54.9%  100% 
column %  40.5%  26.3%  31.2 
Receiving Jefes  994  2,311  3,305 
row %  30.1%  69.9%  100% 
column %  59.5%  73.7%  68.8 
Total 1,671  3,134  4,805 
row %  34.8  65.2%  100% 
column %  100%  100%  100% 
All active adults       
Not receiving Jefes  22,285  6,763  29,047 
row %  76.7%  23.3%  100% 
column %  97.1%  80.2%  92.6% 
Receiving Jefes  656  1,671  2,327 
Row %  28.2%  71.8%  100.0 
column %  2.9%  19.8%  7.4% 
Total  22,940  8,434  31,374 
row %  73.1%  26.9%  100% 
column %  100%  100%  100% 
      
 
Notes: Individual sample of EPH October 2002. A person is deemed to be “eligible” if he or she lives in a household 
that has dependents (children of the head below 18 or handicapped) and he or she is not in the formal labor market 
as indicated by receipt of formal job benefits. 
   31
Table 2: Descriptive statistics, cross section for October 2002 





heads or spouses 
Active adults  
(18-65) 
   Mean st.dev. Mean st.dev. Mean st.dev. Mean st.dev. 
Individual demographics:          
Male  0.31 0.46 0.39 0.49 0.41 0.49  0.57 0.49 
Age  35.8 11.1 37.1 13.5 38.9 10.2  37.9 12.1 
Marital status – single  0.18  0.38  0.19  0.39  0.02  0.15  0.29 0.45 
Marital status – married  0.68  0.46  0.64  0.48  0.91  0.28  0.61 0.48 
Head    0.43 0.49 0.44 0.49 0.49 0.50  0.49 0.49 
Spouse  of  head  0.34 0.47 0.31 0.46 0.51 0.50  0.21 0.4 
Son/daughter  of  head  0.16 0.36 0.17 0.37  0    0.57 0.42 
Years  of  education  8.07 3.14 8.17 3.29 9.28 3.65  10.77  3.91 
Employment status:          
Jefes main activity  0.72  0.45             
Doing counterpart work (min 20 
hrs) if Jefes is main activity 
0.83  0.37        
Jefes secondary activity  0.28  0.44             
Doing counterpart work (min 20 
hrs) if Jefes is secondary  activity 
0.16  0.36        
Doing counterpart work (min 20 
hrs) 
0.64 0.47       
 
  
Employed  0.84 0.36 0.31 0.46 0.52 0.50  0.17 0.38 
Unemployed  0.06 0.24 0.36 0.48 0.14 0.34 0.83 0.38 
Inactive  0.10 0.29 0.33 0.47 0.35 0.48  -   - 
Total hours worked  19.8  14.2  11.6  21.5    32.5  23.7 
Total hours worked=0  0.14  0.34  0.65  0.47      0.19  0.39 
Household characteristics:          
H’hold size  5.42  2.42  4.89  2.4  4.83  1.83  4.23 2.05 
No. children<18  2.67  1.87  2.08 1.8 2.33 1.51 1.34 1.55 
Total  h’hold  income  420.9 302.1 350.2 323.8 647.3 917.3 985.6  1139.8 
H’hold  p.c.  income  84.1  59.2  77.4  71.87 150.1 226.8 271.8 378.8 
H’hold total income net of Jefes  246  292.6             
H’hold p.c. income net of Jefes  46.8  56.1             
Jefes participation 
Eligibility criteria Jefes: 
1    0    0.12 0.32 0.07 0.26 
H’hold with children of head<18 
or handicapped member 
0.80 0.39 0.66 0.47  1    0.53 0.49 
H’hold with any children<18 or 
handicapped member 
  0.95 0.22 0.84 0.36  1    0.62 0.48 
Individual  is formal worker  0.02  0.14  0.02  0.16  0       
H’hold  has at least one formal 
worker  
0.15 0.35 0.19 0.39 0.28 0.44 0.53 0.49 
Eligible individual (2) any 
children, individual not formal 
worker) 
0.93 0.25 0.82 0.38 0.80 0.40 0.41 0.49 
Eligible individual (1) children of 
head, individual not formal 
worker) 
0.69 0.45 0.54 0.49  1    0.26 0.43 
Eligible h’hold (h’hold with at 
least one eligible individual (1)) 
0.79 0.40 0.64 0.47  1    0.45 0.49 
No. observations in the sample  3,092    1,713    13,934    31,374     32






heads or spouses 
Active adults 
(18-65) 
  Mean st.dev. Mean st.dev. Mean st.dev. Mean st.dev. 
Individual demographics:          
Male  0.29 0.45 0.46  0.5  0.39 0.49 0.59 0.49 
Age  35.79 11.17  37.3  13.36 39.64 10.19 38.83 12.15 
Marital status – single  0.2  0.4  0.24 0.43 0.02 0.15 0.28 0.45 
Marital status – married  0.69 0.46 0.63 0.48 0.91 0.28 0.62 0.48 
Head  0.37 0.48 0.44  0.5  0.47 0.50 0.51 0.50 
Spouse of head  0.39 0.49  0.3  0.46 0.53 0.50 0.20 0.40 
Son/daughter of head  0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.43 
Years of education  8.24  3.2  7.94 3.34 9.05 3.72  10.59  3.94 
Employment status:          
Employed  0.43  0.5  0.44  0.5  0.46 0.50 0.83 0.37 
Unemployed  0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.14 0.34 0.17 0.37 
Inactive  0.38 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.41 0.49  0   
Total hours worked  13.9 21.5 14.6 22.7 18.7 26.2  34.31  24.3 
Hours worked=0  0.58 0.49 0.57 0.49 0.55 0.47 0.19 0.39 
employment status*gender:          
male*employed  0.66 0.48 0.56  0.5         
male*unemployed  0.26 0.44 0.28 0.45         
male*inactive  0.08 0.08 0.15 0.08         
female*employed  0.36 0.48 0.33 0.36         
female*unemployed  0.16 0.32 0.11 0.32         
female*inactive  0.48 0.5 0.55 0.5         
Household characteristics:          
HH size  5.58 2.51 5.12 2.61 4.96 1.88 4.35 2.12 
Nominal h’hold income  426.4 366.7 427.2 369.1 692.8 998.3 980.2  1130.2 
Nominal h’hold income per capita  84.5 81.3 98.4  95 156.5  237.9  279.9  363.2 
Eligibility criteria Jefes:          
H’hold with children of head<18 or 
handicapped member  0.80 0.40 0.67 0.46  1    0.53 0.49 
H’hold with any children<18 or 
handicapped  member  0.94  0.22  0.79  0.40    0.61  0.48 
Individual is formal worker  0.03 0.18 0.06 0.23  0    0.39 0.48 
H’hold with at least one formal 
worker    0.19 0.40 0.25 0.43 0.29 0.46 0.56 0.49 
Eligible individual (children of 
head, individual not formal worker)  0.67 0.47 0.52 0.50  1    0.26 0.43 
Eligible household (h’hold with at 
least one eligible individual)  0.78  0.41  0.65  0.47  1    0.44  0.49 
No. observations  1222    679    5,273   11,401    33
Table 4: Distribution of shocks: actual and simulated changes in real household income 
between Oct 2001 and Oct 2002 
 
Applicants 

















 Percentiles  Percentiles  Percentiles  Percentiles  Percentiles  Percentiles 
Household income         
1% -2187.9  -1688.5 -1838.5  -1788.5  -1763.5 -1759.8 
5% -994.0  -1004.6  -1154.6  -1104.6 -1079.6  -1127.9 
10% -730.9 -647.7  -797.7  -747.7  -722.7  -756.7 
25% -410.3 -306.7  -456.7  -406.7  -381.7  -398.2 
            
Median -168.2  -68.2  -218.2  -168.2  -143.2  -172.1 
            
75%  0.0  103.0  -47.0 3.0 28.0  22.1 
90% 123.3  252.7  102.7  152.7  177.7  169.7 
95% 280.0  364.5  214.5  264.5  289.5  272.8 
99% 500.0  685.7  535.7  585.7  610.7  564.1 
          
Mean -258.9  -151.7  -301.7 -251.7 -226.7  -242.1 
Std. Dev.  450.6  434.1  434.1  434.1  434.1  437.5 
Individual income         
1% -775.2 -825.8 -975.8  -925.8  -900.8 -1032.2 
5% -446.1 -337.9 -487.9  -437.9  -412.9 -469.8 
10% -318.2 -198.5  -348.5  -298.5  -273.5  -318.0 
25% -139.4  -59.1  -209.1  -159.1  -134.1  -144.8 
            
Median 0.0 140.0 -10.0  40.0  65.0  45.8 
            
75% 0.0  150.0  0.0  50.0  75.0  77.4 
90% 88.5  150.0  0.0  50.0  75.0  90.1 
95% 150.0  190.0  40.0  90.0  115.0  109.4 
99% 293.0  300.0  150.0  200.0  225.0  181.8 
          
Mean -77.3  28.8  -121.2 -71.2 -46.2  -61.2 
Std. Dev.  213.3  214.6  214.6  214.6  214.6  226.3 
 
Note: the estimated foregone income is based on the SD estimates on individual income in October 2002.  34
Table 5: Initial location of participants and applicants in the national distribution of 






Deciles of 2001 
h’hold income 
per capita 
Households individuals Households Individuals 
1  18.47 15.94 14.79  15.30 
2  32.99 25.75 27.80  20.95 
3  21.25 14.39 23.76  14.90 
4 10.56  16.57  9.98  17.26 
5 7.99  10.28  7.14  9.41 
6  4.07 7.87 6.12  6.85 
7  3.44 4.99 7.38  7.07 
8  0.17 3.14 1.97  5.30 
9  0.59 0.29 0.83  2.59 




Table 6: Initial location of eligible active adults in the national distribution of income (Oct 
2001), panel sample  










1  12.3 14.2 30.7 
2  14.6 16.2 26.9 
3 10.3  10.9  7.8 
4  12.7 12.7 11.8 
5 12.1  11.8  8.5 
6 11.1  10.1  4.7 
7  8.2 7.3 4.1 
8  8.1 7.4 3.7 
9  6.3 5.5 1.7 
10  4.4 4.1 0.1 
 
Note: “Theoretical eligibility” is defined as a household with dependents (of the head), for which the head is 
unemployed and the Jefes participant is the head.    35
Table 7: Location of Jefes participants in the cross-sectional  
distribution of income 
Assuming zero foregone income   
Trabajar participants 1997
(%) 




Deciles of h’hold 
income per capita (net 
of the transfer)  households individuals  households individuals households individuals
1 58.2  60.1  28.9  29.0 13.5 14.4 
2  17.5  18.5  23.2  23.5 11.3 13.6 
3 9.9  9.5  18.6  18.6 12.2 13.7 
4 6.8  5.8  12.9  13.1 12.6 12.7 
5 2.2  1.9  8.9 8.5  11.7  10.8 
6 2.5  1.6  5.1 4.9  11.0  10.2 
7 1.7  1.6  1.5  1.6 8.9 8.2 
8 0.6  0.5  0.6  0.5 7.2 6.5 
9  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3 6.8 5.9 
10  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1 4.9 4.2 
with the estimated foregone income   
Trabajar participants 1997
(%) 
Jefes participants 2002 
(%) 
  Deciles of h’hold 
income per capita  
(net of the net gains)   individuals  households  individuals    
1  48.1  3.6 19.5     
2  27.7  41.0  27.4     
3  13.5  27.7 20.2     
4   7.3  13.9 15.2     
5   1.7  8.7 9.1     
6 1.7 
(deciles 6-10)  3.3 5.2     
7     1.3 2.3     
8     0.4 0.9     
9     0.1  0.2    
10     0.1 0.1     
 
Data sources: Trabajar: Encuesta de Desarrollo Social 1997 (zero foregone income from  
Table 2, net gains estimates from Table 5 (“non parametric method”) in  Jalan and Ravallion (2003); 
Jefes: own calculations from EPH October 2002. 
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  Table 8:  Probits for calibrating the propensity scores: Jefes participants vs. applicants 
  Cross-section 
Oct 2002   
Panel 
Oct 2001-Oct 2002 
  Coeff. t-stat    Coeff. t-stat 
age 18-24  0.002 0.02  age 18-24  0.068 0.53 
age 25-29  0.191 2.25  age 25-29  0.329 2.62 
age 30-39  0.159 2.12  age 30-39  0.094 0.85 
age 40-49  0.334 4.71  age 40-49  0.275 2.52 
Male  -0.371 -6.89  Male  -0.544 -5.55 
Head  0.012 0.17  Head  -0.022 -0.19 
Spouse of head  -0.317 -3.8  Spouse of head  -0.323 -2.45 
Single  -0.003 -0.04  single  -0.041 -0.32 
Married  0.144 1.89  married  0.249 1.94 
Incomplete primary  -0.045 -0.51  incomplete primary  0.003 0.02 
Complete primary  0.013 0.16  complete primary  -0.092 -0.67 
Incomplete secondary  0.021 0.27  incomplete secondary  -0.089 -0.66 
Complete secondary  0.002 0.02  complete secondary  0.041 0.28 
House - villa  0.130 1.21  house – villa  -0.089 -0.51 
House - departam.  -0.109 -1.6  house – apartment  -0.028 -0.24 
1 room house  -0.196 -2.07  no. rooms  -0.023 -0.82 
2 rooms  -0.072 -0.86  Bathroom  0.022 0.2 
3 rooms  -0.130 -1.62  rent house  -0.222 -1.8 
4 rooms  -0.117 -1.39  free renters  -0.404 -3.05 
Bathroom  -0.034 -0.33  walls –mamposteria  0.002 0.02 
Renting house  -0.094 -1.34  share members 0-5  1.408 3.27 
Free renter  -0.117 -1.63  share members 6-17  1.421 3.6 
Walls -mamposteria  -0.011 -0.15  share members18-64  0.468 1.29 
Water - cloaca  0.082 0.89  household size  0.010 0.64 
Water - pozo  0.151 1.55  unemployed   0.103 0.9 
Water - camara  0.073 0.78  inactive   -0.115 -1.05 
Share members 0-5  1.224 4.91  public employee   0.533 2.49 
share members 6-17  0.956 4.25  teacher   0.333 1.25 
share members18-64  0.185 0.92  social service   0.251 1.18 
Household size  0.006 0.59  manufacturing   0.087 0.53 
Region Noroeste  -0.373 -4  construction worker  0.218 1.49 
Region Nordeste  -0.173 -1.79  domestic worker  -0.145 -1.1 
Region Cuyo  -0.654 -6.19  region Noroeste  -0.344 -2.4 
Region Pampeana  -0.027 -0.3  region Nordeste  -0.185 -1.24 
Region Patagonica  -0.094 -0.88  region Cuyo  -0.615 -3.76 
     region Pampeana  0.134 0.91 
     region Patagonica  -0.212 -1.18 
No. Obs.  4803   No. obs.  1899  
no.treated off support  6    no.treated off support  28   
Pseudo R2  0.060    pseudo R2  0.0817   
    
    Note: dependent variable =1 if individual participated in Jefes in October 2002 and 0 otherwise.   37
















Cross section (October 2002)         
) 1 | ( 1 = D Y E   438.3 172.9  0.86  0.04  0.10 20.6 
) 0 | ( 1 = D Y E   357.1  83.7 0.37 0.30 0.33  11.4 
Matched single difference          
) 0 | ( ) 1 | ( 1 1 = − = = D Y E D Y E SD   81.19 89.2  0.49 -0.26  -0.23 9.2 
  (16.0) (5.27) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.8) 
95% confidence interval  [63.8, 127.6]  [81.2, 101.9]  [0.45, 0.52]  [-0.29,-0.22]  [-0.27, -0.18] [8.0, 11.4] 
 
Panel (October 2001-October 2002)           
) 1 | ( 0 1 = − D Y Y E   -147.2 30.2  0.42  -0.15 -0.27 6.4 
) 0 | ( 0 1 = − D Y Y E   -250.6 -83.6  -0.03  0.08  -0.04 -234 
Matched double-difference: 
) 0 | ( ) 1 | ( 0 1 0 1 = − − = − = D Y Y E D Y Y E DD   103.41 113.55  0.46  -0.23  -0.23  8.9 
  (32.27) (15.08)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (1.5) 
95% confidence interval  [67.8,195.9]  [78.5, 138.4]  [0.32,0.49]  [-0.27,  -0.09] [-0.30,  -0.15] [5.8, 12.1] 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 repetitions. In the panel sample, real income figures are base 2002 (annual 
inflation rate of 39.4%).  
38 
Table 10: Impact of the Jefes program on the aggregate unemployment rate 








assuming that Jefes 









42.2 41.8 42.8  42.9  42.0 
Employment rate  
(employed/total) 
34.5 32.8 35.2  32.7  33.5 
Unemployment rate 
(unemployed/actives) 
18.3 21.5 17.8  23.6  20.3 
 
Note: For comparability with previous EPH surveys, these calculations apply to 28 urban conglomerates (excluding 
Viedma, Rawson, San-Nicolas which were added in October 2002, as well as new areas added in the GBA). We 
follow INDEC in the definition of the activity/employment/unemployment rates.  
* Source: INDEC (2002a). 
† Estimated net gains on employment, unemployment and inactivity from Table 9, single difference estimates. Let 
actual number of employed individuals be  t E , and the number of unemployed be  t U  and J be the total number of 
Jefes participants in October 2002. Then the actual unemployment rate is  ) /( t t t E U U +  while the counterfactual 
unemployment rate is  ) 23 . 0 /( ) 26 . 0 ( J E U J U t t t − + + . 
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Table 11: Impacts on labor supply and household size 





 Employed  unemployed inactive  employed  unemployed inactive   
) 1 | ( 0 1 1 = − + D Y Y E t t   0.39  -0.08 -0.27  0.04  -0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 
) 0 | ( 0 1 0 = − + D Y Y E t t   0.04  0.07  -0.06 -0.03  0.06 0.01 0.02 -0.01 
Matched double-difference:              
) 0 | (
) 1 | (
0 1 0





D Y Y E
D Y Y E DD
t t
t t t t
 
0.35    -0.15 -0.21  0.07  -0.10 0.03 0.03 0.04 
  (0.05)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
95% confidence interval  [0.17,0.39]  [ -0.20, -0.03]  [-0.27, -0.06]  [-0.19, -0.02] [-0.19, -0.02] [-0.03,0.10] [-0.14,0.18]  [-0.11, 0.18]
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Table 12: Stratification of net gains 
Real Income impacts    Cross sectionSD   PanelDD  
            


























Participant is:           










































          









Note: Sample standard errors are in parentheses (not bootstrapped). 
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Table 13: Impact of the Jefes program on aggregate poverty rates 
Counterfactual, in the absence of the 
program 
 
% below the 
poverty line 










Greater Buenos Aires    
Poverty      
Individuals 54.3  54.7  54.5 
Households 42.3 42.6  42.5 
Indigence      
Individuals 24.7  27.0  26.2 
Households 16.9 18.7  18.0 
Total 31 conglomerates    
Poverty      
Individuals 57.5  58.1  57.9 
Households 45.7 46.2  46.1 
Indigence      
Individuals 27.5  30.5  29.6 
Households 19.5 21.9  21.1 
 
Note: Income per adult equivalent are constructed using the adult equivalent scales provided by INDEC. For the 
analysis, new areas interviewed were excluded as well as households with partial income responses. 
* Source: INDEC (2002b), INDEC(2003). 
† Estimated net gains on income from Table 8, single difference individual estimates.   42
 Table 14: Measures of protection/promotion for Jefes participants 
Official poverty lines 
Actual joint distribution     
  non-poor 2002  poor 2002   
non-poor 2001  0.07  0.20  0.27 
poor 2001  0.02  0.71  0.73 
  0.09 0.91  1 
Counterfactual joint distribution† 
  non-poor 2002  poor 2002   
non-poor 2001  0.04  0.22  0.27 
poor 2001  0.01  0.72  0.73 
  0.06 0.94  1 
      
Official indigence line (food poverty line) 
Actual joint distribution     
  non-poor 2002  poor 2002   
non-poor 2001  0.39  0.30  0.68 
poor 2001  0.08  0.24  0.32 
  0.47 0.53  1 
Counterfactual joint distribution† 
  non-poor 2002  poor 2002   
non-poor 2001  0.28  0.40  0.68 
poor 2001  0.05  0.27  0.32 
  0.33 0.67  1 
      
 
Note: Income per adult equivalent is constructed using the adult equivalent scales.  
Equivalence scales, poverty  and indigence lines from INDEC (2002b, 2002c, 2003).  
†Estimated net gains for 2002 from Table 8, single difference individual estimates. 
   43
Table A1: Comparison of survey-based participation rates with the administrative data 
Grossed-up EPH estimates of 
number of participants  Administrative data  
Conglomerates  Point estimate 
95% confidence 
interval    
Registered in 
municipalities 




†   
Tucumán 30,454  [  23,451 37,457  ]  38,829 *  29,387  
Tierra del Fuego  2,341  [  1,494  3,188  ]  2,694    2,277  
Santiago del Estero  11,813  [  8,828  14,798  ]  23,404  *  22,066 * 
Santa Cruz  1,378  [  839  1,917  ]  1,584    1,362  
San Luis  3,701  [  2,496  4,906  ]  6,607  *  6,361 * 
San Juan  12,053  [  8,988  15,118  ]  21,131  *  16,185 * 
Salta 23,592  [  19,243 27,941  ]  31,948  *  28,412 * 
Rio Negro  3,049  [  2,028  4,070  ]  2,840    3,706  
Neuquen 8,411  [  6,469  10,353  ]  8,831   8,132  
Misiones 11,164  [  8,302  14,026  ]  11,997   10,337  
Mendoza 20,001  [  14,460 25,542  ]  31,686 *  21,828  
La Rioja  7,014  [  5,671  8,357  ]  9,768  *  8,751 * 
La Pampa  2,710  [  1,832  3,588  ]  2,956    2,890  
Jujuy 15,542  [  11,996 19,088  ]  26,834  *  25,718 * 
Formosa 16,865  [  14,037 19,693  ]  21,513  *  20,431 * 
Gran Parana  6,667  [  4,872  8,462  ]  8,185    7,729  
Concordia 5,155  [  3,844  6,466  ]  7,861 *  7,643 * 
Corrientes 16,325  [  12,840 19,810  ]  27,111 *  15,936  
Rio Cuarto  4,455  [  3,093  5,817  ]  6,503  *  5,796  
Gran Cordoba  53,380  [  40,058 66,702  ]  48,067    46,317  
C.Rivadavia 1,851  [  1,049  2,653  ]  2,988  *  2,735 * 
Rawson 4,310  [  3,169  5,451  ]  4,467   4,018  
Chaco 21,709  [  16,060 27,358  ] 36,729  *  34,082 * 
Catamarca 10,955  [  9,046  12,864  ]  14,879 *  15,499 * 
Gran Rosario  56,920  [  43,906 69,934  ]  79,361  *  75,631 * 
Gran Santa Fe  23,628  [  19,255 28,001  ]  29,513  *  28,577 * 
Villa Consitucion  8,224  [  5,276  11,172  ]  6,353    7,124  
Capital Federal  27,008  [  10,677 43,339  ]  55,437  *  49,421 * 
Conurbano 379,009  [  311,738 446,280  ]  418,018    369,349  
La Plata  28,593  [  21,184 36,002  ]  25,960    23,885  
Bahía Blanca  6,375  [  3,502  9,248  ]  5,244    5,367  
Mar del Plata  16,754  [  10,788 22,720  ]  16,789    15,706  
Total Urban Areas  841,406  [  767,394 915,418  ]  1,036,087  *  922,658 * 
Note: * significantly different from that implied by the survey data.  Standard errors corrected for complex survey 
design were provided by INDEC. 
† Source: Calculations (kindly provided by the Ministry of Labor) are based on overlapping the database of  
liquidacion de beneficiarios (MTESS) and base de personas (ANSES)   44
 





























Note: Concentration curves for zero foregone income (individuals); see Table 7. 
 
 
Figure 2: Eligibility of Jefes participants: cumulative distributions of income  
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Figure 3: Overlapping support in the distribution of the propensity score 
Panel sample: 
0
 Treated: On support  Untreated



















Note: histogram of propensity score distribution for Jefes participants (treated) and Jefes applicants (untreated). 28 




 Treated: On support  Untreated



















Note: histogram of propensity score distribution for Jefes participants (treated) and Jefes applicants (untreated). 6 
(0.2%) of the participants are off the common support.  
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Figure 4:  Impacts on poverty amongst Jefes participants: cumulative distributions  
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Note: the counterfactual distribution is based on the single difference individual income estimates 
of net gains from the program. 
 
 
Figure 5:  Impacts on poverty nationally: cumulative distributions of income  
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Note: the counterfactual distribution is based on the single difference individual income estimates of net gains from 
the program. 